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The Opt-Out Revolution: A Descriptive Analysis 
 
Using data from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Census, I find little support for the opt-out 
revolution – highly educated women, relative to their less educated counterparts, are exiting 
the labor force to care for their families at higher rates today than in earlier time periods – if 
one focuses solely on the decision to work a positive number of hours irrespective of marital 
status or race. If one, however, focuses on both the decision to work a positive number of 
hours as well as the decision to adjust annual hours of work (conditional on working), I find 
some evidence of the opt-out revolution, particularly among white college educated married 
women in male dominated occupations. 
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 1. Introduction 
  A number of recent studies have attempted to find evidence to support the opt-out 
revolution—highly educated women, relative to their less educated counterparts, are exiting the 
labor force to care for their families at higher rates today than in earlier time periods—which was 
first sensationalized by Lisa Belkin in a 2003 New York Times article.
1  The preponderance of 
these studies focus on the employment side of opting-out (i.e., conditional on having children 
women exit the labor market)
2 and generally conclude that there is no evidence to support the 
popular press’ notion of an opt-out revolution, that is, the child penalty is not found to be higher 
for highly educated women compared to less educated women in recent years (see for example, 
Boushey 2005, Goldin 2006, Vere 2007, Cohany and Sok 2007, Fortin 2008, and Percheski 
2008).
3     
  What can account for the discrepancy in the press’ accounts of the opt-out revolution and 
the studies of the employment side of the opt-out revolution (henceforth referred to as the opt-out 
literature)?  One possibility is the opt-out literature tends to focus on the child penalty unadjusted 
for demographic characteristics, such as, marital status and race/ethnicity (henceforth referred to 
                                                 
1 Many other media reports followed (see for example, Wallis 2004, Story 2005, and Trunk 2005).   
2 Several studies examine the fertility side of opting out.  The results are mixed; Vere (2007) and Shang and 
Weinberg (2009) find increased fertility among college educated women while Percheski (2008) finds no change in 
fertility among professional women.  Others have examined the impact of opting-out on labor market outcomes 
among alumni from top-ranked colleges.  Goldin and Katz (2008) find no evidence of the opt-out revolution among 
Harvard University alumnae but do find that opting out impacts earnings, although differentially by occupation.  
Herr and Wolfram (2009) find that alumnae from Harvard University are less likely to stay attached to the labor 
market if their workplace lacks family friendly policies.  Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2009) find that the gender 
wage gap among MBA graduates from the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business can largely be 
explained by career interruptions from childbirth.  Several studies also seek to understand why highly educated 
women are exiting the labor market and what the associated costs of exiting may be (see for example, Stone and 
Lovejoy 2004, Hewlett et al. 2005, Williams et al. 2006, Hewlett 2007, and Stone 2008); these studies tend to be 
more qualitative in nature. 
3 The one exception is Vere (2007) who does find evidence that highly educated women with children are exiting the 
labor market at higher rates than their less educated counterparts.  However, he only focuses on women 27 years of 
age which is very young for childbearing, particularly in later cohorts for highly educated women.   
  1as race).
4  The labor supply decisions of prime-aged women (henceforth referred to as women) 
with children who are not married are likely to be very different than those of their married 
women counterparts, particularly at the top of the education distribution, as these women are 
likely married to men who are also highly educated and have high earning power, affording them 
the ability to exit the labor market when they have children (see for example, Williams et al. 
2006).
5   Indeed highly educated married women tend to be the focus of the media accounts 
(Williams et al. 2006).  In addition, in 2000 marriage rates among women are higher at the top of 
the education distribution than at the bottom of the education distribution; this is in stark contrast 
to 1980 where highly educated women are generally less likely to get married than their less 
educated counterparts.
6  Marriage rates have fallen over time as well (see Table 1).  Thus by 
combining married and non-married women, one may be underestimating the child penalty, 
particularly in recent years.   
Similarly, the labor supply decisions of non-Hispanic white (henceforth referred to as 
white) women with children are likely to be very different than those of their non-white 
counterparts.  The media attention is generally more focused on white affluent women in white 
collar jobs (Williams et al. 2006). Furthermore, white women are generally more attached to the 
                                                 
4 Boushey (2005) does allow for intercept effects of race/ethnicity and marital status when estimating the effect of 
children on women’s labor force attachment but does not allow for slope effects (i.e., she does not interact marital 
status or race/ethnicity with children).  Cohany and Sok (2007) do report labor force participation by race, however 
they only do so for married women with infants.  While Fortin (2008) estimates the effect of children on women’s 
labor force participation separately by marital status and education, she only stratifies by two education categories: 
less than college and college graduates.  Fortin (2008) also analyzes the effect of children on black women’s labor 
force participation, however, she does not allow for differential effects of children by education or marital status for 
this group of women. Another demographic characteristic is immigrant status.  Results that focus solely on non-
immigrants are generally similar and available upon request.   
5 Cha (2009) finds that professional women with children, married to professional men, were substantially more 
likely to exit the labor market if their partner worked extreme hours (>60 hours) relative to their childless 
counterparts whose partners did not work extreme hours. 
6 The marriage rates for women aged 25-44 in 1980 are 69% (less than high school), 76% (high school), 72% (some 
college) and 69% (college).  The marriage rates for women aged 25-44 in 1990 are 58% (less than high school), 
68% (high school) , 66% (some college), and 66% (college).   The marriage rates for women aged 25-44 in 2000 are 
57% (less than high school), 63% (high school) , 63% (some college), and 66% (college).    
  2labor market, are more likely to have a college education, more likely to be married, and are less 
likely to have children, and if they do have kids, they have fewer of them, relative to their non-
white counterparts (see Table 1).  Moreover, racial differences in educational attainment have 
become more pronounced over time. All of these racial differences suggest that the child penalty 
may differ substantially by race, and these differences may shed light on the discrepancies 
between the results presented in the media and the opt-out literature. 
Another possibility is the opt-out literature generally focuses on one aspect of female 
labor supply, the decision to work a positive number of hours (i.e., the extensive margin), as 
opposed to conditional on participating in the labor market, the decision to adjust annual hours of 
work (i.e., the intensive margin).
7  I argue focusing on both margins may be important because 
women, particularly highly educated women, may not be choosing to exit the labor market 
entirely, but may be opting for reduced hours of work.  There is support for this in the qualitative 
literature on opting out (see for example, Hewlett et al. 2005, Hewlett 2007, and Stone 2008), 
that is, highly educated women are seeking alternative occupations which are less demanding, 
afford them more flexibility, and require a reduced time commitment.  Moreover, Belkin (2003) 
recognized this possibility in her New York Times Magazine article.  This then suggests that 
defining opting out simply on a woman’s decision to exit the labor market may be masking some 
of the employment aspect of the opt-out revolution.     
A third possibility is defining highly educated women simply as college educated may 
obscure the opt-out phenomenon.  It may be that it is college educated women in specific 
managerial/professional occupations, particularly male dominated occupations (e.g., architects, 
engineers, lawyers, and physicians), that are more likely to opt out of the labor market in terms 
                                                 
7 Percheski (2008) does consider alternative measures of labor supply (full-time year round employment and works 
50+ hours per week) but does not try to disentangle the relative roles of extensive and intensive margin.     
  3of both the extensive and intensive margin.
8  On the one hand, women in these occupations may 
be more inclined to exit the labor market entirely because these occupations offer the least 
amount of job flexibility (see Stone 2008).  On the other hand, women in these types of 
occupations likely worked extreme hours (e.g., 60+ hours/week) prior to having their 
child/children, and may be able to adjust their hours down to accommodate their new family 
roles.  In addition, it is this group of women that the media tends to focus on (see Williams et al., 
2006). 
In this paper, I show that, as in the existing opt-out literature, there is little evidence to 
support the opt-out revolution if one focuses solely on the extensive margin.  Specifically, using 
the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Census, I find that the child penalty for women fell substantially 
between 1980 and 1990 irrespective of one’s level of education.  Moreover, the child penalty for 
this group did not increase in recent years; in fact the child penalty continued to fall (although to 
a lesser degree) between 1990 and 2000 for all education categories except for the college 
educated category where the child penalty in 2000 remained roughly equal to the child penalty in 
1990. The same patterns generally hold for college educated married women irrespective of race, 
that is, the child penalty did not increase between 1990 and 2000.   
As predicted, I find that the overall child penalty in female labor supply is higher if one 
focuses on both the extensive and intensive margin, suggesting the importance of accounting for 
both margins.  Despite this, the overall child penalty in female labor supply for college educated 
married women does not rise, as predicted by the opt-out revolution, but falls in recent years.  
While this holds true for white and Hispanic college educated married women, the reverse is true 
                                                 
8 While Percheski (2008) does examine women in managerial/professional occupations, as well as the subset of 
traditionally male and female dominated occupations within this occupational category, she does not examine 
detailed occupations in managerial/professional occupations, traditionally male occupations, or traditionally female 
occupations.  Focusing on aggregate categories may mask the opt-out phenomenon as there are different degrees of 
flexibility and the incidence of extreme hours in the detailed occupations within each occupation category. 
  4for their non-Hispanic black (henceforth referred to as black) and Asian counterparts.  Strikingly, 
I find that the child penalty does increase between 1990 and 2000 for white college educated 
married women who are in male dominated occupations whereas for white college educated 
married women in female dominated and mixed occupations the child penalty decreases between 
1990 and 2000.  Taken together, these patterns suggest that there is some support for the opt-out 
revolution particularly among the group of women that the media tends to focus on, that is, white 
college educated married women who are in male dominated occupations. 
  The remainder of the paper is as follows.  The data is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 
examines labor force attachment by marital status, race, year and level of education.  Section 4 
presents the results for the child penalty decomposition.  Section 5 presents an in depth analysis 
for white college educated married women. The conclusions are presented in Section 6.  
 
2. Data 
  I use data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) 5% sample of the 
1980, 1990, and 2000 United States Census. This data is ideal for my purposes because it has 
detailed information on family characteristics (marital status and presence of children), labor 
market characteristics (usual hours worked per week, weeks worked in the past calendar year, 
and occupation), and demographic characteristics (age and education), as well as having large 
samples of women within educational, racial/ethnic, and occupational categories.
9
                                                 
9 Ideally, one would supplement the Census data with data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to get 
information on the years between the censuses, as well as information beyond 2000.  Unfortunately, due to small 
sample sizes this is not possible for all educational, racial/ethnic, and occupational categories.  Despite this 
shortcoming, I am able to use the CPS to investigate the opt-out phenomenon for Non-Hispanic white college 
educated married women.  This analysis is presented in detail in Section 5. 
  5  I restrict the sample to women between the ages of 25-44 who are employed in the 
civilian labor force and do not have allocated values on any of the variables of interest.
10  I focus 
on 25-44 year olds to ensure that women have completed their formal education, as well as 
allowing them sufficient time to begin forming their families.  I only focus on the civilian labor 
force as the armed forces labor force is very different and likely attracts women with different 
preferences for work and family. 
I consider four racial groups, white, black, Hispanic, and Asian.  These are constructed as 
indicator variables equal to one if the respondent is of that particular race, and zero otherwise.
11  
Table 1 presents summary statistics by race and year.  The proportion of the female population 
that is white (non-white) decreased (increased) over the time period, with the biggest increase 
realized by Hispanics.  Whites (Hispanics) accounted for 80.7 (6.1), 76.5 (8.1), and 70.7 (10.9) 
percent of the female population in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively.     
I consider three measures of labor supply. The first measure of labor supply considered is 
unconditional annual hours of work.  This is defined as usual hours per week times weeks 
worked in the past calendar year.  It therefore includes women who are not working as by 
construction it includes zero values.  I also consider conditional annual hours of work measured 
as annual hours of work conditional on working positive annual hours of work.  Finally, I 
consider labor force attachment (LFA) which is defined to equal one if a respondent worked 
positive annual hours, and zero otherwise.
12  By focusing on these three measures, I am able to 
examine both the intensive and extensive margins (discussed in detail below). 
                                                 
10 Specifically, I drop an individual if they have an allocated value for age, sex, race, Hispanic, education, usual 
hours of work, weeks worked per year, employment status, marital status, and relationship to household head. 
11 In order to construct these variables I rely on two IPUMS variables: race (RACED) and Hispanic origin 
(HISPAND). 
12 Alternatively I could have used labor force participation (LFP) which equals one if a respondent was employed or 
actively seeking employment in the reference week, and zero otherwise.  While this is the measure generally 
considered in the opt-out literature, for my purposes labor force attachment (LFA) is needed to determine the 
  6  Women were more attached to the labor market in 2000 relative to 1980 irrespective of 
the labor supply measure considered, although the biggest increase in labor supply occurred 
between 1980 and 1990.  For example, LFA rates in 1980, 1990, and 2000 are 68.3, 77.2, and 
78.7 percent, respectively.  The same general pattern holds for all races, although it is more 
pronounced for white women.  Focusing again on LFA, white women’s LFA rates increased 12.3 
percentage points between 1980 and 2000 while black, Hispanic, and Asian women’s LFA rates 
increased by 9.8, 8.1, and 2.3 percentage points, respectively, in this time period.  
To determine the child penalty, information on presence of children in the household is 
needed.  I use the family relationship variables constructed in the IPUMS data to ascertain the 
presence of children.  The first indicator variable is constructed based on the number of own 
children (biological, adopted, or step children) in the household (NCHILD).   Specifically, I 
create an indicator variable equal to 1 if there are no own children in the household, and zero 
otherwise.  A second indicator variable is constructed based on the number of own children 
under age 5 in the household (NCHLT5).  Specifically, I create an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
there are any own children less than 5 in the household, and zero otherwise.  For prime-aged 
women, own children in the household is a relatively good approximation for fertility (see 
Rindfuss 1976).  The number of own children decreased from 1.668 in 1980, to 1.399 in 1990, 
and 1.386 in 2000 while the proportion of women who had no children increased from 25.6 
percent, to 31.6 percent in 1990, and 33.0 percent in 2000.  The proportion of women having 
children less than five is relatively stable between 1980 and 2000;  27.6, 27.2, and 26.5 percent 
in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively.  While the levels are different across racial groups (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                             
relative roles of the intensive and extensive margins of labor supply.  Results based on LFP are very similar to 
results based on LFA and are available upon request. 
  7non-whites have more children than their white counterparts), the overall patterns tend to hold 
for all racial groups.  
I also create a marital status indicator variable equal to one for married, spouse present, 
and zero otherwise.  Marriage rates have fallen over time from 72.9 percent in 1980, to 65.6 
percent in 1990, and to 63.4 percent in 2000.  Blacks experienced the largest decline in marriage 
rates between 1980 and 2000 (11.8 percentage points) followed by whites (8.6 percentage 
points), Asians (6.8 percentage points), and Hispanics (6.8 percentage points).   
In addition, I consider 4 educational categories, less than high school (grade 11 or less), 
high school (grade 12), some college (1-3 years of college), and college (4+ years of college).
13  
These are constructed as indicator variables equal to one if the respondent has attained that 
particular level of education, and zero otherwise.  Women have acquired more education 
between 1980 and 2000; 18.0 (18.5), 10.9 (23.7), and 8.8 (29.6) percent of women had a less 
than high school (college) degree in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively.  The increase in college 
attendance between 1980 and 2000 is highest for Asians (37.2 to 51.5 percent), followed by 
whites (19.9 to 32.7 percent), blacks (11.1 to 19.1 percent), and Hispanics (7.4 to 13.7 percent). 
  Finally, I examine detailed occupations that fall into 3 occupational categories within the 
managerial/professional occupations: male dominated (roughly 70 percent male or higher in 
1980, 1990 and 2000), female dominated (roughly 30 percent male or lower in 1980, 1990 and 
2000), and mixed occupations (roughly between 40 and 60 percent male in 1980, 1990 and 
2000).  These categories are constructed based on the “occupation, 1990 basis” (OCC1990) 
                                                 
13 These categories are constructed based on the educational attainment recode variable (EDUREC) in the IPUMS 
data which combines two separate IPUMS variables HIGRADE and EDUC99.  The former is available from 1940 
to 1980 and the latter is available from 1990-2000.  The recoded variable was constructed to allow for analysis 
across the years.  The main differences are high school based on EDUC99 is 12
th grade no diploma and high school 
diploma or GED, some college based on EDUC99 is some college no degree, occupational associate degree, and 
academic associate degree, and college based EDUC99 is bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, professional degree 
and doctorate degree. 
  8variable in the IPUMS data for individuals between the ages of 18 to 64.  An ideal feature of the 
IPUMS occupation question is that it applies to individuals who had worked within the previous 
five years which allows one to examine both the extensive margin and intensive margin.   
Moreover, the 5 year time frame coincides with the presence of young children, i.e., children less 
than 5 years of age. See Appendix Table 2 for a detailed list of occupations by year that fall 
under each occupation category, as well as the percent male within each detailed occupation 
category.   
Unfortunately due to small sample sizes (particularly in male dominated occupations), I 
am only able to consider a subset of detailed occupations within each occupation type (see 
Appendix Table 2 for the sample size of white college educated married women by occupation, 
year, and presence of children).
14  The detailed male dominated occupations considered are 
architects, electrical engineers, physicians, lawyers, clergy/religious workers. The detailed 
female dominated occupations considered are registered nurses, dieticians/nutritionists, 
occupational therapists, primary school teachers, and librarians.  The mixed occupations 
considered are human resources and labor relations manager (henceforth referred to as human 
resources), accountants and auditors, secondary school teachers, economists and market 
researchers (henceforth referred to as economists), and editors/reporters.
 
 
3. Labor Force Attachment (LFA) by Year, Education, and Race 
Following the opt-out literature, I first focus on the extensive margin (i.e., the decision to 
work a positive number of hours).  Figure 1 presents the labor force attachment (LFA) rates for 
all women aged 25-44 by presence of young children, year, and education.  Figure 1 also 
presents the child penalty measured as: 
                                                 




LFA LFA 5 −
                                     (1) 
where  LFA is mean labor force attachment and NK and KLT5 denote women without children 
and women with young children, respectively.
15   
There are several noteworthy patterns.  First, LFA of women with young children has 
increased over time irrespective of education category, although the increase is more pronounced 
between 1980 and 1990 than between 1990 and 2000.  For example, the LFA rate for women 
with young children increased from 52.0 in 1980 to 65.0 percent in 1990 and 68.0 percent in 
2000.  Perhaps surprisingly, the same is not true for women without children.  For less educated 
(high school or below) the LFA of childless women decreased over time (e.g., 56.5, 54.8 and 
52.4 percent in 1980, 1990, and 2000 for women with less than high school) while for more 
educated (some college and above) the LFA of childless women remained relatively flat between 
1980 and 2000 (e.g., 94.9, 95.6 and 94.4 percent in 1980, 1990, and 2000 for women with 
college). 
  Second, LFA is higher among women with higher levels of education relative to their less 
educated counterparts irrespective of year or presence of children.   Focusing on 2000, it can be 
seen that the LFA rate for childless women with less than high school is 52.4 percent while their 
high school, some college, and college counterparts have LFA rates of 77.7, 89.5, and 94.4 
percent, respectively. 
  Third, childless women have higher LFA rates than women with young children.  This is 
again true regardless of the education category or year considered.  For example, in 1990 the 
LFA rate for childless women is 77.6 percent while the LFA rate for women with young children 
LFA rate is 64.5 percent.   
                                                 
15 Percheski (2008) measures the child penalty analogously. 
  10Fourth, there is no clear pattern by education in the child penalty in a given year.  In 1980 
and 1990 the child penalty rises (falls) as one acquires more education at the bottom (top) of the 
education distribution while in 2000 the child penalty generally rises with education.  For 
example, in 1980 (2000) the child penalty for women with less than high school, high school, 
some college, and college is 31.7 (16.6), 40.7 (18.9), 37.5 (18.9), and 34.2 (21.8), respectively.  
There is, however, a clear pattern in the child penalty over time in a given education category.  
Specifically, the child penalty fell between 1980 and 1990 for all education groups, while 
between 1990 and 2000 it fell (although a much smaller decline than in the previous time period) 
for all education groups except college educated women where the penalty remained relatively 
constant.  For instance, the child penalty for high school educated women went from 40.6 
percent in 1980, to 26.6 percent in 1990, to 18.9 percent in 2000 while for college educated 
women the child penalty went from 34.2 percent in 1980, to 22.2 percent in 1990, to 21.8 percent 
in 2000.  Taken together, these results provide little support for the media accounts of the opt-out 
revolution.
16
  Figure 1 combines all women irrespective of marital status.  As previously discussed, the 
media tends to focus on highly educated married women who may have the luxury to opt-out of 
the labor market because they tend to be married to highly educated men with high earning 
potential (see for example, Williams et al. 2006).  Moreover, marriage rates for college educated 
women in 2000 are higher than those of their less educated counterparts; this was not true in 
1980.  Marriage rates have fallen over time as well (see Table 1), although less so for college 
educated women.  By combining married women with non-married women, one may be 
underestimating the child penalty, particularly in recent years.  Thus, for the remainder of the 
                                                 
16 The same patterns are found if one examines the child penalty by education, age, and year, as well as by 
education, age, and birth cohort (results available upon request).  This is discussed in greater detail for a subset of 
the sample in Section 5. 
  11analysis I focus on married women.  Figure 2 presents the LFA rates and the child penalty for 
married women by presence of young children, education, and year.  While there is evidence that 
the child penalty is underestimated in recent years (particularly at the bottom of the education 
distribution), it remains the case that the child penalty did not rise between 1990 and 2000 for 
college educated women. 
Allowing for differential effects by race may help shed light on the discrepancy between 
the media accounts of the-opt out revolution and the results presented to this point.   Specifically, 
it is unlikely that the child penalty will be the same by race given there are substantial racial 
differences in labor force attachment, educational attainment, marital status, and presence of 
children (see Table 1).  Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6 present the LFA rates and the child penalty for 
married women by presence of young children, education, and year for whites, blacks, Hispanics, 
and Asians, respectively. 
Not surprisingly, the results for married white women (Figure 3) mirror those presented 
for all married women (Figure 2) given white women make up such a large share of the total 
population.  The patterns for non-white married women differ somewhat from their white 
counterparts.  In particular, the child penalty generally falls as non-whites acquire more 
education irrespective of year.
17  The child penalty is generally smaller in magnitude for non-
whites, and this is particularly true for married black women.
18  For example, the child penalty 
for white married women in 2000 is 29, 26, 24, and 24 percent for less than high school, high 
school, some college, and college, respectively (see Figure 3) while the child penalty for black 
married women in 2000 is 1, 3, 7, and 7 percent for less than high school, high school, some 
                                                 
17 The main exception is for Black married college educated women in 2000 who face a higher child penalty than 
their less educated counterparts. 
18 The main exception is for Asian married women with less than high school in 1990 who face a child penalty of 42 
percent (see Figure 6) while their white married counterparts face a child penalty of 28 percent (see Figure 3). 
  12college, and college, respectively (see Figure 4). What is true for all racial groups, however, is 
that the child penalty for college educated women did not increase between 1990 and 2000. 
The LFA patterns revealed in Figures 1 through 6 are consistent with the evidence from 
the opt-out literature (see Boushey 2005, Cohany and Sok 2007, and Percheski 2008) and 
suggest that the opt-out revolution, as sensationalized by Lisa Belkin in a 2003 New York Times 
article, is not generally supported in the data. In other words, the child penalty did not increase in 
recent year for college educated women, nor did college educated women face a higher child 
penalty relative to their less educated counterparts within a given year, irrespective of race or 
marital status.
19  
This conclusion however is based on the extensive margin (i.e., the decision to work a 
positive number of hours), and does not consider the intensive margin (i.e., conditional on 
participating in the labor market, the decision to adjust annual hours of work).  I argue this is 
important because women, particularly highly educated women, may not be choosing to exit the 
labor market entirely, but may be opting for reduced hours of work.  This then suggests that 
defining opting out as simply labor market attachment may be masking some of the “opt-out 
revolution”. The remainder of the paper examines the child penalty based on both the extensive 
and intensive margin. 
 
4. Decomposition of the Overall Child Penalty by Year, Education, and Race 
To formally analyze both the extensive and intensive margin, I first note that mean 
unconditional annual hours is equal to conditional annual hours times LFA.  Given this, the child 
                                                 
19 The main exception is for black college educated married women in 2000 who face a child penalty of 7 percent, 
while black married women with less than high school, high school, and some college face a child penalty of 1, 3, 
and 7 percent, respectively (see Figure 4). 
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=
−
                               (2) 
where UAH is mean unconditional annual hours, CAH is mean conditional annual hours, LFA is 
mean labor force attachment, and M, NK, and KLT5 denote married, women without children, 
and women with young children, respectively.  I now add and subtract from the numerator of the 
right hand side (RHS) of equation (2) the counterfactual mean unconditional annual hours for 
married women without children if they had the mean labor force attachment of married women 






























LA CAH LA CAH LA CAH LA CAH
UAH
UAH UAH
5 5 5 5
5
* * * * − + −
=
−


































                 (4) 
The first term on the RHS of equation (4) represents the portion of the overall child penalty due 
to the extensive margin and the second term represents the portion of the overall child penalty 
due to the intensive margin.
20  Dividing each term on the RHS of equation (4) by the overall 
                                                 
20 Instead, I could have added and subtracted from equation (3) the counterfactual mean unconditional annual hours 





KLT LA CAH * 5 ).  This adjusts the intensive margin, as opposed to the extensive margin (as is done in 
equation 3).  While this yields a slightly larger role for the intensive margin, the overall patterns are the same 
(results available upon request).    
  14child penalty (and multiplying by 100) gives the percent explained by the extensive and intensive 
margin, respectively.
21   
Before focusing on the decomposition results, it is worthwhile to discuss the patterns in 
female labor supply based on unconditional annual hours, as well as the patterns in the overall 
child penalty.   Unconditional annual hours have generally increased for married women 
irrespective of presence of children or level of education (see Figure 7).
22  For example, college 
educated childless women worked 1624 unconditional annual hours in 1980 compared to 1835 
and 1887 unconditional annual hours in 1990 and 2000, respectively.   While this rise in 
unconditional annual hours holds for white married women (see Figure 8), it does not for their 
non-white counterparts (see Figures 9-11).   For example, black married childless women with 
lower levels of education (high school or less) experience a fall in unconditional annual hours 
between 1990 and 2000 (see Figure 9).  In addition, the overall child penalty is higher than the 
child penalty in LFA irrespective of race, education level, and year, suggesting the importance of 
accounting for both the extensive and intensive margin.  For example, for college educated 
married women in 2000 the overall child penalty is 38.6 (see Figure 7) while the child penalty in 
LFA is 21.8 (see Figure 1). 
Turning to the decomposition results (see Table 2), I find the intensive margin explains a 
larger share of the overall child penalty as married women acquire more education irrespective of 
the year considered.   For example, in 2000 the intensive margin explains 26.6, 33.9, 40.9, and 
42.8 percent of the overall child penalty for less than high school, high school, some college, and 
college, respectively (see column 3).  Interestingly, the portion of the overall child penalty 
                                                 
21 Antecol and Steinberger (2009) use a similar technique to examine differences in labor supply between married 
women and partnered lesbian women. 
22 The main exception is for married women with young children who have less than high school between 1990 and 
2000 where unconditional annual hours marginally fell. 
  15explained by the extensive margin decreased between 1980 and 1990 and increased between 
1990 and 2000 for all education categories, although it is more pronounced for college educated 
women.  This suggests that married women, particularly college educated married women, in 
recent years are reverting back to adjusting their labor supply on the extensive margin as 
opposed to the intensive margin.  This is noteworthy in its own right as it may reflect the fact that 
college educated married women may have less of an opportunity to adjust their hours of work 
any further due to workplace hour constraints. If they require more flexibility than their 
workplace can provide, then they may feel they are left with no choice but to exit the labor 
market.  This phenomenon has been documented in the qualitative literature (see for example, 
Stone 2008). 
The overall patterns hide some important racial differences.  While similar results are 
found for white and Hispanic married women, the same is not true for black and Asian married 
women.  For black married women, the intensive margin plays the biggest role for college 
educated women relative to their less educated counterparts in 1980 and 1990 (see columns 7 
and 8) while in 2000 it is least important for college educated women relative to their less 
educated counterparts (see column 9).  This is largely explained by the fact that the LFA rates of 
black married women with less than high school in 2000 were virtually identical, not because 
black married women with young children substantially increased their LFA between 1990 and 
2000 in this education category but because childless black married women with less than high 
school substantially reduced their LFA during this time period (see Figure 4).  There are no clear 
patterns in the importance of the intensive margin by level of education for Asian married 
  16women.
23  For black (Asian) married college educated women, on the other hand, the relative 
role of the extensive margin remained roughly the same (decreased) between 1990 and 2000.   
  Despite the fact that the aforementioned patterns illustrate the importance of accounting 
for both the extensive and intensive margins, as with the child penalty in LFA, the overall child 
penalty does not increase in recent years for married college educated women (see Figure 7).  
This, however, masks important racial differences.  Specifically, the child penalty for black 
(Asian) college educated married women increases by 1.5 (2.3) percentage points between 1990 
and 2000 (see Figure 9 (11)).  For white and Hispanic college educated married women, the child 
penalty falls by 3.6 and 3.1 percentage points, respectively, between 1990 and 2000 (see Figures 
8 and 10, respectively).  These patterns continue to suggest limited evidence in support of the 
opt-out revolution, particularly for white college educated married women who tend to be the 
focus of the media.  This may be driven by the fact that college education is too coarse of a 
definition for this group.  Thus the remainder of the paper presents an in depth examination of 
white college educated married women. 
 
5. A Further Investigation of Non-Hispanic White College Educated Married Women  
 
  The opt-out phenomenon among non-Hispanic white (henceforth referred to as white) 
college educated married women may be obscured for a number of reasons.  First, it may be that 
limiting the analysis to 2000 is too early a time period in which one could detect the opt-out 
phenomenon, which was not brought to the public’s attention until Belkin’s 2003 New York 
Times article.  Second, it may be that the propensity to opt-out of the labor market varies by age 
                                                 
23 According to Table 2 (columns 13-15), the relative importance of the intensive margin in 1980 is higher for Asian 
married women with some college, followed by less than high school, college, and high school while in 1990 (2000) 
the relative importance of the intensive margin is higher for Asian married women with some college (less than high 
school) followed by high school (college), college (some college), and less than high school (high school). 
  17for college educated women as there may be large differences in the work behavior of young 
women relative to older women due to, for example, a change in preferences towards work and 
family (i.e., culture).   Finally, it may also be that college educated women across occupation 
categories have different propensities to opt-out of the labor market as the opportunities for 
work-place flexibility vary by occupation.  Each of these possibilities is examined in turn. 
  Table 3 presents the decomposition of the overall child penalty for white college 
educated married women by year: 1980, 1981-1983, 1984-1986, 1987-1989, 1990, 1991-1993, 
1994-1996, 1997-1999, 2000, 2001-2003, 2004-2006, 2007-2009.  The data for 1980, 1990, and 
2000 continue to be based on the U.S. census data, while the data for the intervening years are 
from Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) March Current Population Survey (CPS) 
samples. These data are ideal for these purposes because IPUMS constructs the variables to align 
with those in the census data, however, the CPS sample sizes are small.
24  Given the small 
sample sizes, I pool over three year periods in the CPS.  Interestingly, it can be seen that, if 
anything, evidence of the opt-out phenomenon actually occurs between the latter half of the 
1990s and the early 2000s, as opposed to the mid- to the late- 2000s.
25  Specifically, the overall 
child penalty falls continuously from 60.3 in 1980 to 40.2 in 1997-1999, increases to 41.6 in 
2000 and 42.2 in 2001-2003,
26 then falls thereafter (39.9 in 2004-2006 and 38.3 in 2007-2009).
27  
                                                 
24 Ideally one would use this data throughout the analysis, however due to small sample sizes this is not possible for 
all educational, racial/ethnic, and occupational categories.   
25 Interestingly, a similar pattern is found if one solely examines the extensive margin.  In particular, the child 
penalty in labor force attachment continuously falls from 37.1 in 1980 to 20.1 in 1997-1999, increases to 23.6 in 
2000, and then falls thereafter (23.5 in 2001-2003, 22.6 in 2004-2006, and 21.1 in 2007-2009). 
26 If one pools the CPS over 1999-2001 in an attempt to get an approximation of the 2000 Census number (41.6), the 
child penalty is 42.0, which is very much in line with the Census data. 
27 This is generally true for all levels of education, although it is noisier in the 1990’s for white married women with 
less than high school due to small cell sizes. Moreover, this holds true for white married college educated women 
across the age distribution. 
  18Table 4 presents the decomposition of the overall child penalty for white college 
educated married women by year and  4 age groups, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, and 40-44.
28  Not 
surprisingly the overall child penalty is smaller for the youngest women (25-29) and steadily 
increases until the oldest age group (40-44) where it begins to decline irrespective of year.  For 
example, in 2000 the overall child penalty is 34.12, 42.77, 45.47, and 41.89 for white college 
educated married women aged 25-29, 30-44, 35-39, and 40-44, respectively.  Moreover, the 
intensive margin is of greater importance for young women relative to their older counterparts 
for all years.  This lends support to the hypothesis that work behavior differs by age.  Despite 
these age differences, there continues to be little support for the opt-out revolution for white 
college educated married women.  In particular, the overall child penalty falls substantially 
between 1980 and 1990, and continues to fall between 1990 and 2000 although to a lesser extent, 
irrespective of the age group considered.
29
 Table 5 presents the decomposition of the overall child penalty by year and occupation.  
I focus on managerial/professional occupations for a number of reasons.  First, 
managerial/professional occupations tend to be the focus of the media (see Williams et al., 
2006).  Second, lack of work place flexibility in these occupations (see Stone 2008) may result in 
women choosing to exit the labor market entirely on the one hand while on the other hand 
extreme hours in these types of occupations may afford women the ability to reduce their hours 
in light of new family responsibilities.  This further highlights the importance of accounting for 
both the extensive and intensive when examining managerial/professional occupations.   
                                                 
28 Appendix Table 3 reveals that the results are very similar if I instead employ a cohort analysis, that is, I do not 
find evidence of the opt-out phenomenon among white college educated married women. Specifically, support of the 
opt-out phenomenon requires that the overall child penalty rises for more recent birth cohorts relative to earlier birth 
cohorts.  I find, however, that the overall child penalty becomes smaller as one moves from earlier birth cohorts to 
more recent birth cohorts for all age groups for white married college educated married women.   
29 The patterns by age groups mirror those for the overall college educated sample for blacks, Hispanics, and Asians 
presented in Table 2.  Results are available upon request. 
  19Table 5 reveals that white college educated married women in managerial/professional 
occupations are more likely to adjust their hours (conditional on working) than exit the labor 
market, suggesting ignoring the intensive margin (as Belkin 2003 suggests) misses a large 
portion of the story.  Despite this, it is still the case that white college educated married women 
in managerial/professional occupations experience a fall in the overall child penalty between 
1990 and 2000 (36.29 to 32.05).   
Looking at all managerial/professional occupations, however, combines all occupations 
irrespective of their gender mix. Given work-place flexibility and extreme hours likely vary a 
great deal by an occupation’s gender mix, I look at detailed occupations in three occupation 
categories: male dominated occupations (architects, electrical engineers, physicians, lawyers, 
clergy/religious workers), female dominated occupations (registered nurses, 
dieticians/nutritionists, occupational therapists, primary school teachers, and librarians), and 
mixed occupations (human resources, accountants and auditors, secondary school teachers, 
economists, and editors/reporters).  See the data section for a detailed discussion of occupation 
definitions.
 
  The results are striking.  For male dominated occupations the child penalty in 
unconditional annual hours generally falls between 1980 and 1990 and generally increases 
between 1990 and 2000.
30  For example, the child penalty in unconditional annual hours 
                                                 
30 The main exception is clergy/religious workers.   This occupation category, as defined by the Census 
(http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/ioindex/ioindex02/txtnew02.html#21-2099) includes clergy (“Conduct religious 
worship and perform other spiritual functions associated with beliefs and practices of religious faith or 
denomination. Provide spiritual and moral guidance and assistance to members.”), directors, religious activities and 
education (“Direct and coordinate activities of a denominational group to meet religious needs of students. Plan, 
direct, or coordinate church school programs designed to promote religious education among church membership. 
May provide counseling and guidance relative to marital, health, financial, and religious problems.”), and all other 
religious workers (“All religious workers not listed separately.”).  The latter two categories are likely dominated by 
women, make up the bulk of the women in the overall clergy/religious workers occupation, and  more closely 
resemble occupations in female dominated occupations (e.g., teachers). The overall results for clergy/religious 
workers, therefore, more closely align with female dominated, rather than male dominated occupations. 
  20increased from 35.2 to 39.5 for architects between 1990 and 2000.  This rise between 1990 and 
2000 is in sharp contrast to the patterns found for female dominated occupations (with the 
exception of dieticians/nutritionists) and mixed occupations.
31  Perhaps not surprisingly, women 
are generally more likely to adjust their hours of work (conditional on working) in male 
dominated occupations.  In female dominated occupations, the importance of the intensive 
margin varies depending on specialty.  In the medical specialty (i.e., registered nurses, 
dieticians/nutritionists, occupational therapists) the intensive margin is of more importance than 
in the education specialty (i.e., primary school teachers, and librarians).  For mixed occupations, 
the relative role of the extensive and intensive margin is closer together, particularly in earlier 
years.  These patterns illustrate that accounting for differences in work-place flexibility and the 
incidence of extreme hours across occupations is important.  Moreover, these patterns provide 
support for the popular press’ notion of the opt-out revolution, particularly among white college 
educated married women in male dominated occupations.   
 
6. Conclusion 
  The “opt-out revolution” was first sensationalized in a 2003 New York Times article by 
Lisa Belkin and suggests that highly educated women (relative to their less educated 
counterparts) are exiting the labor market to care for their children more in recent years, that is, 
highly educated women face a higher child penalty than their less educated counterparts.  This 
spurred a flurry of media attention to the issue, as well as increased interest among academics 
across the social sciences.  The majority of the studies examine the employment side of the opt-
                                                 
31 Analysis on alternative female dominated occupations and mixed occupations yield similar results and are 
available upon request. 
  21out revolution (i.e., conditional on having children women exit the labor market).
32  With the 
exception of Vere (2007), they find little support for the media’s account of highly educated 
women’s recent exodus from the labor market to care for their children (see for example, 
Boushey 2005, Goldin 2006, Cohany and Sok 2007, Fortin 2008, and Percheski 2008). 
  The purpose of this study is to further document the evidence on the employment side of 
the opt-out revolution by allowing for differential effects of children on female labor supply by 
race, marital status, and occupation, as well as examining both the extensive margin (i.e., the 
decision to work a positive number of hours) and the intensive margin (i.e., conditional on 
participating in the labor market, the decision to adjust annual hours of work) of female labor 
supply. 
Using the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Census, I find little evidence to support the opt-out 
revolution if one focuses solely on the extensive margin.  In other words, I do not find that the 
child penalty for college educated women increased in recent years (1990 to 2000) irrespective 
of marital status or race.  What is true, however, is that the child penalty falls substantially 
between 1980 and 1990 for all education levels and the penalty continues to fall (although to a 
lesser extent) for less educated women between 1990 and 2000 while the penalty remains flat 
during this time period for their college educated counterparts.   
The patterns are very different if one focuses on the overall child penalty (based on both 
the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply).  While the overall child penalty falls 
between 1990 and 2000 for white and Hispanic college educated married women, the opposite 
                                                 
32 There are several other aspects of the opt-out literature. Vere (2007), Percheski (2008), and Shang and Weinberg 
(2009) examine the fertility side of opting out. Goldin and Katz (2008), Herr and Wolfram (2009), and Bertrand, 
Goldin, and Katz, (2009) examine the impact of opting out on labor market outcomes among alumni at Harvard 
University and the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business, respectively.  Stone and Lovejoy (2004), 
Hewlett et al. (2005), Williams et al. (2006), Hewlett (2007), and Stone (2008) seek to understand why highly 
educated women are exiting the labor market and what the associated costs of exiting may be. 
  22pattern is found for their black and Asian counterparts.  In addition, I find that the overall child 
penalty increases between 1990 and 2000 for white college educated married women who are in 
male dominated occupations, while the same is not true for female dominated occupations or 
mixed occupations.  Overall, these patterns provide some evidence in support of the opt-out 
revolution, particularly for the group of women that tend to be the focus of the media, that is, 
white married college educated women in male dominated occupations. 
Future work is needed to provide explanations for the patterns documented in this paper.  
Why do the opt-out patterns vary by race?  Is it an artifact of cultural factors (i.e., different 
preferences for work and family)? Why do women opt-out? Is it family pulls (e.g., birth of a 
child), or is it work-place pushes (e.g., lack of flexibility on the job)?  Or is it a combination of 
the two?
33  Does the importance of pulls vs. pushes vary by race?  Conditional on exiting the 
labor market, how long do women remain out of the labor market? What types of occupations do 
they transition back into? How long do the transitions back into the labor market typically 
take?
34 Does race play a role in re-entry?  Why do the opt-out patterns vary by occupation?  Is it 
an artifact of differences in work- place flexibility and the incidence of extreme hours? 
                                                 
33 There is a growing literature that is investigating this, although it is generally focused on highly educated 
professional women (see Stone and Lovejoy 2004, Hewlett et al. 2005, Hewlett 2007, Stone 2008, and Herr and 
Wolfram 2009). 
34 Hewlett et al. (2005) and Hewlett (2007) provide evidence on re-entry for highly qualified professionals. 
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Child penalty calculated as: [(LFA No Kids-LFA Kids Less Than 5)/(LFA No Kids)]*100
Figure 2. Labor Force Attachment (LFA) by Presence of Children, Education, Year 
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Child penalty calculated as: [(LFA No Kids-LFA Kids Less Than 5)/(LFA No Kids)]*100Figure 3. Labor Force Attachment (LFA) by Presence of Young Children, Education, Year 
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Child penalty calculated as: [(LFA No Kids-LFA Kids Less Than 5)/(LFA No Kids)]*100
Figure 4. Labor Force Attachment (LFA) by Presence of Young Children, Education, Year 
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Child penalty calculated as: [(LFA No Kids-LFA Kids Less Than 5)/(LFA No Kids)]*100Figure 5. Labor Force Attachment (LFA) by
 
 Presence of Children, Education, Year 
(Married Hispanic Women Aged 25-44)
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Child penalty calculated as: [(LFA No Kids-LFA Kids Less Than 5)/(LFA No Kids)]*100
Figure 6. Labor Force Attachment (LFA) by Presence of Young Children, Education, Year 
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Child penalty calculated as: [(LFA No Kids-LFA Kids Less Than 5)/(LFA No Kids)]*100Figure 7. Unconditional Annual Hours (AHRS) by Presence of Children, Education, Year 
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Child penalty calculated as: [(AHRS No Kids-AHRS Kids Less Than 5)/(AHRS No Kids)]*100
Figure 8. Unconditional Annual Hours (AHRS) by Presence of Young Children, Education, Year 
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Child penalty calculated as: [(AHRS No Kids-AHRS Kids Less Than 5)/(AHRS No Kids)]*100Figure 9. Unconditional Annual Hours (AHRS) by Presence of Young Children, Education, Year 



































1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000














































     20  











Figure 10. Unconditional Annual Hours (AHRS) by Presence of Children, Education, Year 
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51Figure 11. Unconditional Annual Hours (AHRS) by Presence of Young
 
 Children, Education, Year 
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37Table 1. Summary Statistics by Race/Ethnicity and Year 
(Women Aged 25-44)
Total Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black Hispanic Asian
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Race/Ethnicity^
WHITE 0.81 0.77 0.71
BLACK 0.10 0.11 0.11
HISPANIC 0.06 0.08 0.11
ASIAN 0.02 0.03 0.05
Labor Supply
AHRS 1032.74 1296.97 1393.57 1031.52 1327.86 1438.58 1131.59 1286.48 1444.46 866.78 1062.63 1125.51 1097.25 1244.07 1271.62
WKSWRK 28.10 33.91 35.76 28.24 34.93 37.11 29.96 32.82 36.30 23.16 27.49 28.92 28.47 31.23 31.63
UHRS 24.21 28.79 30.04 24.17 29.29 30.70 26.03 28.81 31.54 21.21 24.78 25.48 25.54 27.56 27.77
CAHRS* 1519.44 1679.63 1770.24 1507.02 1676.94 1775.69 1609.80 1718.35 1795.67 1495.89 1626.96 1689.56 1620.49 1760.41 1804.16
LFA 0.68 0.77 0.79 0.68 0.79 0.81 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.58 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.71 0.70
Education
LTHIGH 0.18 0.11 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.05 0.29 0.15 0.10 0.46 0.35 0.32 0.18 0.13 0.08
HIGH 0.44 0.33 0.28 0.46 0.34 0.27 0.41 0.37 0.33 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.26 0.22 0.17
SOMECOL 0.19 0.32 0.34 0.20 0.33 0.35 0.19 0.33 0.38 0.13 0.24 0.25 0.19 0.25 0.23
COLLEGE 0.19 0.24 0.30 0.20 0.26 0.33 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.38 0.40 0.52
Family Relationship
MARRIED 0.73 0.66 0.63 0.77 0.70 0.68 0.47 0.37 0.35 0.69 0.62 0.63 0.78 0.73 0.71
NCHILD 1.68 1.40 1.39 1.62 1.34 1.33 1.94 1.54 1.47 2.10 1.77 1.73 1.50 1.34 1.19
NCHLT5 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.48 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.38 0.36
NOKID 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.26 0.33 0.34 0.23 0.28 0.31 0.20 0.26 0.27 0.30 0.35 0.39
KIDLT5 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.37 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.30 0.29
Age
AGE 33.40 34.11 34.95 33.45 34.23 35.21 33.18 33.79 34.70 33.17 33.37 33.90 33.30 34.21 34.33
N 1,296,068 1,635,258 1,589,181 1,052,561 1,283,288 1,152,947 131,166 158,876 164,045 76,955 126,889 165,967 26,514 51,220 65,403
Source: U.S. Census (IPUMS).  All observations with flagged values on any of the variables of interest are dropped from the analysis.  Sampling weights used.
See Appendix Table 1 for variable definitions.
^ Does not sum to one as Native Americans and other races not included.
*Number of observation is lower b/c they refer only to those working positive hours.Table 2. Decomposition of the Child Penalty in Unconditional Annual Hours by Race/Ethnicity, Year, and Education
(Married Women Aged 25-44)
Total Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black Hispanic  Asian
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Total
Child Penalty 58.53 43.64 39.84 62.01 45.71 41.42 22.54 19.20 15.17 50.77 41.34 40.69 37.64 27.77 26.47
Extensive Margin 40.20 25.89 24.55 42.41 26.40 24.53 11.71 9.40 5.80 37.73 29.26 30.41 30.01 22.46 20.02
% Explained (68.68) (59.32) (61.62) (68.40) (57.74) (59.22) (51.93) (48.94) (38.21) (74.31) (70.79) (74.74) (79.73) (80.87) (75.65)
Intensive Margin 18.34 17.76 15.29 19.60 19.32 16.89 10.84 9.80 9.37 13.04 12.07 10.28 7.63 5.31 6.44
% Explained (31.32) (40.68) (38.38) (31.60) (42.26) (40.78) (48.07) (51.06) (61.79) (25.69) (29.21) (25.26) (20.27) (19.13) (24.35)
Less Than High School
Child Penalty 50.29 41.69 41.54 55.01 44.36 44.89 19.39 25.26 11.14 46.90 34.73 36.06 43.19 46.30 35.72
Extensive Margin 35.65 29.22 30.48 38.30 28.37 29.28 10.30 16.61 0.89 36.07 24.78 28.69 35.07 42.90 23.91
% Explained (70.89) (70.08) (73.39) (69.63) (63.96) (65.23) (53.13) (65.77) (7.97) (76.91) (71.35) (79.57) (81.21) (92.66) (66.93)
Intensive Margin 14.64 12.47 11.05 16.71 15.99 15.61 9.09 8.65 10.26 10.83 9.95 7.37 8.12 3.40 11.81
% Explained (29.11) (29.92) (26.61) (30.37) (36.04) (34.77) (46.87) (34.23) (92.03) (23.09) (28.65) (20.43) (18.79) (7.34) (33.07)
High School
Child Penalty 58.76 42.74 39.00 62.39 45.24 40.97 20.70 18.48 12.24 48.16 35.18 35.22 36.76 25.70 25.58
Extensive Margin 41.43 27.05 25.79 44.38 28.38 26.41 10.10 9.15 3.45 32.42 25.49 25.38 29.58 20.43 21.63
% Explained (70.51) (63.29) (66.13) (71.13) (62.74) (64.46) (48.80) (49.50) (28.15) (67.33) (72.45) (72.06) (80.47) (79.52) (84.58)
Intensive Margin 17.33 15.69 13.21 18.01 16.86 14.56 10.60 9.33 8.80 15.73 9.69 9.84 7.18 5.26 3.94
% Explained (29.49) (36.71) (33.87) (28.87) (37.26) (35.54) (51.20) (50.50) (71.85) (32.67) (27.55) (27.94) (19.53) (20.48) (15.42)
Some College
Child Penalty 58.65 41.84 37.61 62.36 44.65 40.71 26.58 20.28 16.83 45.15 34.50 30.80 37.44 25.53 23.85
Extensive Margin 38.75 23.58 22.22 41.29 25.13 23.97 14.14 9.28 7.48 31.84 21.06 20.88 27.93 17.42 17.73
% Explained (66.08) (56.36) (59.09) (66.21) (56.29) (58.88) (53.18) (45.77) (44.41) (70.52) (61.04) (67.78) (74.61) (68.24) (74.35)
Intensive Margin 19.90 18.26 15.39 21.07 19.52 16.74 12.45 11.00 9.36 13.31 13.44 9.92 9.51 8.11 6.12
% Explained (33.92) (43.64) (40.91) (33.79) (43.71) (41.12) (46.82) (54.23) (55.59) (29.48) (38.96) (32.22) (25.39) (31.76) (25.65)
College
Child Penalty 56.61 42.31 38.62 60.25 45.11 41.55 18.49 15.13 16.63 39.20 35.16 32.04 33.47 22.11 24.42
Extensive Margin 35.05 22.40 22.11 37.06 23.53 23.60 7.45 6.65 7.39 26.18 21.65 20.44 26.85 17.94 18.11
% Explained (61.92) (52.94) (57.24) (61.52) (52.16) (56.78) (40.29) (43.96) (44.42) (66.79) (61.59) (63.80) (80.22) (81.16) (74.15)
Intensive Margin 21.56 19.91 16.51 23.19 21.58 17.96 11.04 8.48 9.24 13.02 13.50 11.60 6.62 4.17 6.31
% Explained (38.08) (47.06) (42.76) (38.48) (47.84) (43.22) (59.71) (56.04) (55.58) (33.21) (38.41) (36.20) (19.78) (18.84) (25.85)
Source: U.S. Census (IPUMS).  All observations with flagged values on any of the variables of interest are dropped from the analysis. Sampling weights used.
Numbers do not always add up due to rounding.Table 3. Decomposition of the Child Penalty in Unconditional Annual Hours by Year  
(Non-Hispanic White College Educated Married Women)
1980 1981-1983 1984-1986 1987-1989 1990 1991-1993 1994-1996 1997-1999 2000 2001-2003 2004-2006 2007-2009
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Child Penalty 60.25 55.09 48.23 46.66 45.11 41.44 40.03 40.17 41.55 42.22 39.90 38.31
Extensive Margin 37.06 30.07 25.95 24.56 23.53 20.66 19.98 20.13 23.60 23.46 22.56 21.09
% Explained (61.52) (54.59) (53.81) (52.65) (52.16) (49.84) (49.90) (50.12) (56.78) (55.57) (56.54) (55.04)
Intensive Margin 23.19 25.02 22.27 22.09 21.58 20.78 20.05 20.04 17.96 18.75 17.34 17.22
% Explained (38.48) (45.41) (46.19) (47.35) (47.84) (50.16) (50.10) (49.88) (43.22) (44.43) (43.46) (44.96)
Source: U.S. Census (IPUMS) in yellow and the March Current Population Survey (IPUMS).  All observations with flagged values on any of the variables of interest
are dropped from the analysis. Sampling weights used. Numbers do not always add up due to rounding.Table 4. Decomposition of the Child Penalty in Unconditional Annual Hours by Year and Age 
(Non-Hispanic White College Educated Married Women)
Total 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Total
Child Penalty 60.25 45.11 41.55 54.46 38.85 34.12 62.47 46.14 42.77 64.20 48.33 45.47 59.95 44.29 41.89
Extensive Margin 37.06 23.53 23.60 29.50 16.97 16.01 39.23 23.73 23.25 43.46 26.50 26.96 41.00 25.85 24.90
% Explained (61.52) (52.16) (56.78) (54.16) (43.68) (46.91) (62.81) (51.43) (54.35) (67.70) (54.84) (59.29) (68.39) (58.37) (59.44)
Intensive Margin 23.19 21.58 17.96 24.96 21.88 18.12 23.23 22.41 19.53 20.74 21.83 18.51 18.95 18.44 16.99
% Explained (38.48) (47.84) (43.22) (45.84) (56.32) (53.09) (37.19) (48.57) (45.65) (32.30) (45.16) (40.71) (31.61) (41.63) (40.56)
Source: U.S. Census (IPUMS).  All observations with flagged values on any of the variables of interest are dropped from the analysis. Sampling weights used.
Numbers do not always add up due to rounding.Table 5. Decomposition of the Child Penalty in Unconditional Annual Hours by Year and Occupation
(Non-Hispanic White College Educated Married Women)
Managerial/Professional
1980 1990 2000
Child Penalty 49.19 36.29 32.05
Extensive Margin 21.89 13.02 12.39
% Explained (44.50) (35.89) (38.67)
Intensive Margin 27.30 23.27 19.65
% Explained (55.50) (64.11) (61.33)
Traditionally Male Dominated Occupations
Architects Electrical Engineers Physicians Lawyers Clergy/Religious Workers
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Child Penalty 51.44 35.16 39.51 27.25 25.66 27.20 28.46 19.88 23.81 24.02 24.53 26.97 46.99 47.77 43.24
Extensive Margin 10.60 9.35 15.12 25.12 9.05 14.11 6.27 3.24 2.22 8.10 8.89 7.97 18.94 14.33 9.66
% Explained (20.61) (26.58) (38.26) (92.20) (35.25) (51.85) (22.03) (16.28) (9.32) (33.73) (36.23) (29.57) (40.30) (29.99) (22.34)
Intensive Margin 40.84 25.82 24.39 2.13 16.62 13.10 22.19 16.64 21.59 15.92 15.64 18.99 28.05 33.45 33.58
% Explained (79.39) (73.42) (61.74) (7.80) (64.75) (48.15) (77.97) (83.72) (90.68) (66.27) (63.77) (70.43) (59.70) (70.01) (77.66)
Traditionally Female Dominated Occupations
Registered Nurses Dieticians/Nutrionists Occupational Therapists Primary School Teachers Librarians
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Child Penalty 49.97 38.05 32.99 48.69 38.44 40.63 49.75 38.38 33.53 48.33 32.26 28.94 49.48 36.48 34.67
Extensive Margin 16.40 9.30 9.56 19.92 9.56 13.43 20.40 6.68 8.04 25.65 14.08 14.16 25.93 16.59 14.78
% Explained (32.81) (24.43) (28.97) (40.90) (24.86) (33.06) (41.01) (17.40) (23.99) (53.08) (43.64) (48.92) (52.40) (45.46) (42.63)
Intensive Margin 33.57 28.76 23.44 28.78 28.89 27.20 29.35 31.70 25.48 22.68 18.18 14.78 23.55 19.89 19.89
% Explained (67.19) (75.57) (71.03) (59.10) (75.14) (66.94) (58.99) (82.60) (76.01) (46.92) (56.36) (51.08) (47.60) (54.54) (57.37)
Mixed Occupations
Human Resources Accountants/Auditors Secondary School Teachers Economists Editors/Reporters
1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000
Child Penalty 38.57 30.46 26.37 43.03 35.09 33.31 45.49 31.72 29.61 41.18 38.93 28.85 56.35 42.27 40.89
Extensive Margin 29.02 17.29 14.35 23.05 15.04 13.00 21.67 13.82 11.80 23.30 21.31 10.81 23.28 13.70 12.69
% Explained (75.22) (56.77) (54.42) (53.55) (42.86) (39.02) (47.65) (43.56) (39.83) (56.58) (54.75) (37.45) (41.31) (32.42) (31.04)
Intensive Margin 9.56 13.17 12.02 19.99 20.05 20.31 23.81 17.90 17.82 17.88 17.62 18.05 33.07 28.57 28.20
% Explained (24.78) (43.23) (45.58) (46.45) (57.14) (60.98) (52.35) (56.44) (60.17) (43.42) (45.25) (62.55) (58.69) (67.58) (68.96)
Source: U.S. Census (IPUMS).  All observations with flagged values on any of the variables of interest are dropped from the analysis. Sampling weights used.
Numbers do not always add up due to rounding.
See Appendix Table 2 for percent male in the occupation and sample sizes.Appendix Table 1. Variable Definitions
Variable  Definition
Labor Supply
UAHRS =unconditional annual hours=(WKSWRK*UHRS)
WKSWRK =weeks worked last year
UHRS =usual hours worked per week 
CAHRS =condtional annual hours=UAHRS if UAHRS>0
LFA =labor force attachment=1 if UAHRS>0, 0 otherwise
LFP =labor force participation=1 if EMP or UNEMP, 0 otherwise
EMP =1 if employed, 0 otherwise
UNEMP =1 if unemployed, 0 otherwise
Education
LTHIGH =1 if less than high school, 0 otherwise
HIGH =1 if high school (with or without degree), 0 otherwise
SOMECOL =1 if some college, 0 otherwise
COLLEGE =1 if ba or higher, 0 otherwise
Race/Ethnicity
WHITE =1 if non-Hispanic white, 0 otherwise
BLACK =1 if non-Hispanic black, 0 otherwise
HISPANIC =1 if Hispanic, 0 otherwise
ASIAN =1 if Asian, 0 otherwise
NATIVE =1 if Native American, 0 otherwise
OTHRACE =1 if other race, 0 otherwise
Family Relationship
MARRIED =1 if married spouse present, 0 otherwise
NCHILD =number of own children in the household
NCHLT5 =number of own children less than 5 in the household
NOKID =1 if no own children present in the household, 0 otherwise
KIDLT5 =1 if any own children less than 5 present in the household, 0 otherwise
Age
AGE =ageAppendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Detailed Occupations by Occupation Type and Year
1980 1990 2000
%Male N (No Kids) N (Kids lt5) %Male N (No Kids) N (Kids lt5) %Male N (No Kids) N (Kids lt5)
Male Dominated Occupations
Chief executives and public administrat 0.747 14 8 0.703 4 5 0.800 381 487
Funeral directors 0.912 3 2 0.864 6 4 0.819 7 10
Purchasing agents and buyers, of farm p 0.904 0 2 0.799 2 2 0.754 4 2
Construction inspectors 0.948 1 0 0.929 3 7 0.890 3 5
Architects 0.905 64 25 0.835 155 169 0.778 178 183
Aerospace engineer 0.966 10 0 0.913 76 52 0.904 34 64
Metallurgical and materials engineers, 0.947 8 1 0.865 9 14 0.886 16 10
Petroleum, mining, and geological engin 0.954 2 1 0.934 11 11 0.928 7 11
Chemical engineers 0.946 12 6 0.882 50 32 0.845 52 64
Civil engineers 0.966 26 12 0.926 90 96 0.888 132 137
Electrical engineer 0.947 52 25 0.899 238 179 0.892 115 114
Industrial engineers 0.898 44 13 0.853 84 77 0.825 122 135
Mechanical engineers 0.976 14 4 0.945 48 51 0.932 75 91
Not-elsewhere-classified engineers 0.957 34 25 0.896 221 174 0.880 178 179
Physicists and astronomers 0.940 7 4 0.852 18 13 0.860 10 10
Atmospheric and space scientists 0.858 1 3 0.877 7 1 0.878 10 5
Geologists 0.871 35 10 0.834 79 53 0.742 133 111
Agricultural and food scientists 0.752 17 10 0.707 35 42 0.726 33 34
Foresters and conservation scientists 0.877 16 8 0.852 36 20 0.841 36 33
Physicians 0.849 257 207 0.778 562 853 0.715 629 1142
Dentists 0.918 30 23 0.857 108 170 0.802 95 159
Optometrists 0.902 9 3 0.821 33 44 0.693 52 77
Podiatrists 0.909 0 2 0.891 5 5 0.821 10 17
Clergy and religious workers 0.851 78 138 0.766 153 63 0.702 214 361
Lawyers 0.844 542 262 0.734 1310 1333 0.682 1350 1728
Announcers 0.790 16 7 0.780 24 29 0.764 16 14Appendix Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Detailed Occupations by Occupation Type and Year (Continued)
1980 1990 2000
%Male N (No Kids) N (Kids lt5) %Male N (No Kids) N (Kids lt5) %Male N (No Kids) N (Kids lt5)
Female Dominated Occupations
Registered nurses 0.039 2027 2853 0.054 3099 6284 0.074 2835 5784
Dietitians and nutritionists 0.096 183 180 0.099 225 417 0.094 211 350
Occupational therapists 0.073 106 94 0.113 206 329 0.096 313 495
Physical therapists 0.257 186 185 0.236 342 507 0.269 520 830
Speech therapists 0.099 329 386 0.072 382 710 0.069 512 722
Therapists, n.e.c. 0.299 106 86 0.259 214 239 0.238 264 270
Kindergarten and earlier school teacher 0.031 410 1058 0.019 254 1037 0.019 508 1257
Primary school teachers 0.219 8251 12576 0.204 6989 11640 0.200 6993 11536
Special education teachers 0.300 89 85 0.163 164 314 0.128 522 688
Librarians 0.167 533 401 0.196 382 403 0.176 256 242
Dancers 0.218 10 4 0.212 16 17 0.130 8 11
Mixed Occupations
Legislators 0.614 5 11 0.573 14 10 0.555 12 8
Human resources and labor relations man 0.615 184 94 0.493 365 267 0.432 540 607
Managers in education and related field 0.596 422 308 0.466 726 813 0.384 675 844
Postmasters and mail superintendents 0.572 1 2 0.540 4 11 0.445 6 7
Managers of properties and real estate 0.550 43 56 0.507 197 209 0.454 181 235
Accountants and auditors 0.588 894 537 0.453 2768 2752 0.405 2688 3967
Other financial specialists 0.516 313 210 0.461 739 742 0.489 734 899
Personnel, HR, training, and labor rela 0.504 491 275 0.416 757 662 0.325 1419 1450
Buyers, wholesale and retail trade 0.517 158 71 0.439 207 197 0.434 185 224
Medical scientists 0.579 32 28 0.558 75 68 0.524 119 103
Subject instructors (HS/college) 0.590 878 1156 0.559 1023 1237 0.510 1460 1684
Secondary school teachers 0.405 2586 3380 0.414 1386 1907 0.396 1462 1975
Archivists and curators 0.504 41 12 0.440 69 44 0.411 69 62
Economists, market researchers, and sur 0.691 151 75 0.549 376 289 0.513 203 238
Social scientists, n.e.c. 0.576 26 16 0.518 44 41 0.485 72 51
Writers and authors 0.507 79 77 0.480 200 281 0.439 247 405
Designers 0.453 380 296 0.408 817 831 0.416 968 1078
Art makers: painters, sculptors, craft- 0.484 223 159 0.446 308 77 0.505 258 220
Editors and reporters 0.477 429 306 0.467 576 554 0.489 506 487
Source: U.S. Census (IPUMS).  All observations with flagged values on any of the variables of interest are dropped from the analysis.  Sampling weights used.
Notes: % Male is the percent of the occupation that is male for all individuals between the ages of 18-64.  N (No Kids) and N(Kids lt5) are the sample sizes for college 
educated Non-Hispanic white married women between the ages of 25-44 without and with kids less than 5, respectively.  Appendix Table 3. Decomposition of the Child Penalty in Unconditional 
Annual Hours by Birth Cohort and Age 
Overall Child Penalty
Age
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
Birth Cohort
1936-1945 64.203 59.954
1946-1955 54.463 62.466 48.330 44.291




25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
Birth Cohort
1936-1945 43.463 41.002
1946-1955 29.499 39.233 26.502 25.853




25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
Birth Cohort
1936-1945 20.741 18.952
1946-1955 24.964 23.233 21.828 18.437
1956-1965 21.879 22.412 18.514 16.990
1966-1975 18.118 19.526
Source: U.S. Census (IPUMS).  All observations with flagged values on any of
the variables of interest are dropped from the analysis. Sampling weights used.
Numbers do not always add up due to rounding.